It surveys how this term is defined in the published literature — what the sources agree on, where they diverge and what remains contested — and carries its own numbered bibliography. It does not describe what we run. Programme policy is on the core pages.
Our own use of the word is often narrower than general usage; the short definition and the boundary are in the glossary, under Experiential learning. The review date below matters, because the literature moves.
A definitional review. Citations follow IEEE style; see References.
Abstract
Experiential learning places direct experience, and reflection on it, at the centre of learning. Its dominant formulation is David Kolb’s 1984 synthesis, which produced both a four-stage cycle and a commercial psychometric instrument, the Learning Style Inventory. The two are routinely treated as one endorsed package. They are not: the cycle is a widely used design heuristic weakly evidenced as a literal account of cognition, while the inventory belongs to a class of learning-styles instruments whose reliability, validity and instructional usefulness have been systematically reviewed and found wanting.
I. Definition
Experiential Learning Theory (ELT) defines learning as “the process whereby knowledge is created through the transformation of experience. Knowledge results from the combination of grasping and transforming experience” [1, p. 41], quoted in [2]. The term experiential differentiates it from cognitive theories, “which tend to emphasize cognition over affect,” and from behavioural theories “that deny any role for subjective experience in the learning process” [2].
Effective learning is claimed to require four abilities: learners “must be able to involve themselves fully, openly, and without bias in new experiences (CE) … reflect on and observe their experiences from many perspectives (RO) … create concepts that integrate their observations into logically sound theories (AC), and … use these theories to make decisions and solve problems (AE)” [1, p. 30], quoted in [8].
II. Origins
Kolb synthesised the theory rather than originating it, and says so. Its “intellectual origins” lie “in the experiential works of Dewey, Lewin, and Piaget. Taken together, Dewey’s philosophical pragmatism, Lewin’s social psychology, and Piaget’s cognitive-developmental genetic epistemology form a unique perspective on learning and development” [2], citing [1]. In the 2015 edition Kolb describes having “noticed the dimensions” of the theory in those scholars’ work and attempted to “integrate the common themes in their work into a systematic framework” [16, pp. 56, xvii], quoted in [8]. The founding intuition is older: Dewey held that although not all experiences are equally educative, “all genuine education comes about through experience” [15, p. 25], quoted in [8].
Two features of the lineage bear on how the theory should be read. First, the reading of the antecedents is contested — Miettinen argued that Kolb’s interpretation of the works on which the model was assembled “gives a unilateral and erroneous picture” of the original theories, so that the phases of the cycle “do not connect to each other in any organic or necessary way” [10, pp. 65, 61], quoted in [8]. Second, the instrument predates the book: Kolb built the Learning Style Inventory in 1971, more than a decade before the 1984 synthesis [2], [7], and it was “originally developed as a self-assessment exercise and later used as a means of construct validation for ELT” [2] — a point that becomes decisive in Section V.
III. The cycle and its two dialectics
The model rests on two dialectically related pairs, not four independent stages: grasping experience — Concrete Experience (CE) ↔ Abstract Conceptualization (AC) — and transforming experience — Reflective Observation (RO) ↔ Active Experimentation (AE) [2]. From these the cycle follows: “immediate or concrete experiences are the basis for observations and reflections. These reflections are assimilated and distilled into abstract concepts from which new implications for action can be drawn. These implications can be actively tested and serve as guides in creating new experiences” [2].
The dialectics are the theoretical content of the model. Each pair “presents us with a choice,” because the poles cannot be occupied simultaneously — one cannot drive a car and analyse the manual at the same instant — and “we resolve the conflict by choosing.” The patterned way an individual resolves both conflicts is what the theory calls a learning style [2]: Diverging (CE+RO), Assimilating (AC+RO), Converging (AC+AE), Accommodating (CE+AE) [2], subdivided in 2011 into a nine-style typology to reduce “the confusions introduced by borderline cases in the old 4 style typology” [7].
The structure has itself been challenged. Coffield et al. note that Wierstra and de Jong’s statistical analyses “have seriously questioned the structure of Kolb’s model on which the learning cycle is based,” and that “the notion of a learning cycle may be seriously flawed” [3]. Bergsteiner et al. attacked the graphical model directly, calling Kolb’s typology “highly muddled” [9, p. 32], via [8].
IV. The learning-styles problem
A. Scale and incentives
Coffield et al.’s review for the UK Learning and Skills Research Centre identified 71 models of learning styles from some 3,800 references and selected 13 for detailed evaluation, Kolb’s LSI among them [3]. The reviewers were blunt about the incentives: “the commercial gains for creators of successful learning styles instruments are so large that critical engagement with the theoretical and empirical bases of their claims tends to be unwelcome” [3].
B. Psychometric findings
The 13 instruments were assessed against four minimal criteria — internal consistency, test–retest reliability, construct validity, predictive validity. Only one model (Allinson and Hayes) met all four. Kolb’s LSI met one [3]. The itemised findings record a “long, public dispute over reliability” of the LSI; that “the construct validity of the LSI has been challenged and the matter is not yet settled”; and that “it has low predictive validity” — with the fair qualification that “it was developed for another purpose — as a self-assessment exercise” [3]. The verdict: “problems about reliability, validity and the learning cycle continue to dog this model” [3].
The publisher’s own technical guide corroborates rather than contradicts this. Internal consistency is good — scale alphas averaging .81 since the 1985 revision — but of the LSI 2 the guide records that “while internal reliability estimates for the LSI 2 remained high in independent studies, test-retest reliability remained low,” and of the current version that “there have been no studies to date of test-retest reliability of the KLSI 4.0” [7]. Of two published test–retest studies of the preceding version, one found correlations above .9 while the other found scale reliabilities averaging .54 and a Kappa of .36 — 47% of respondents changed learning-style classification on retest. The guide calls the discrepancy “difficult to explain” and notes a “long-standing debate about the meaningfulness of test-retest reliability for the LSI” given that the theory holds style to be situational [7].
C. The meshing hypothesis
The practical claim that gives these instruments their value is the meshing hypothesis: that “instruction is best provided in a format that matches the preferences of the learner” [5]. Pashler et al. name Kolb’s framework explicitly as one that assumes it [5]. They specify the design that would validate it — learners grouped by style, randomly assigned within group to different instructional methods, assessed on a common test, yielding a style-by-method crossover interaction — then searched the literature for it:
“we found virtually no evidence for the interaction pattern mentioned above, which was judged to be a precondition for validating the educational applications of learning styles. … of those that did use an appropriate method, several found results that flatly contradict the popular meshing hypothesis.” [5]
Their recommendation is that “the widespread use of learning-style measures in educational settings is unwise and a wasteful use of limited resources” [5]. Coffield et al. reached the matching question independently and “failed to find substantial, uncontested and hard empirical evidence that matching the styles of learner and tutor improves the attainment of the learner significantly” [3]. Pashler et al. add the honest caveat that the shortage of sound studies means “it would be an error to conclude that all possible versions of learning styles have been tested and found wanting; many have simply not been tested at all” [5].
D. Prevalence despite the evidence
Surveying learning-styles papers indexed in ERIC and PubMed between 2013 and 2015, Newton found that 89% of the 109 qualifying papers implicitly or directly endorsed the use of learning styles in higher education, the Kolb classification accounting for 34% of them [6]. Coffield et al. had already observed that use of these inventories “has acquired an unexamined life of its own, where the notion of learning styles itself and the various means to measure it are accepted without question” [3].
V. The cycle is not the inventory
The two artefacts have different evidentiary standings, and the distinction is not merely a defence mounted by critics — it was stated inside the ELT literature itself: “assessing the validity of the underlying theoretical model (ELT) is separate from assessing the validity of the measuring instrument (LSI). Thus, for example, the theory may be valid even though the instrument has psychometric limitations” [2].
As a measurement instrument, the LSI is poorly evidenced. It is a short self-report — “no more than 12 sets of four words to choose from” — and the general objection is that “too much is being expected of relatively simple, self-report tests,” which “are not sampling learning behaviour but learners’ impressions” of how they learn; hence the advice to “advise against pedagogical intervention based solely on any of the learning style instruments” [3].
As a design heuristic, the cycle fares better but remains weakly evidenced as a literal description of cognition. The strongest supportive evidence, two reviews reported by Kolb et al., is modest: Hickox’s analysis of 81 studies found 61.7% supportive and 22.2% unsupportive, while Iliff’s meta-analysis of 101 quantitative studies found most correlations below .5 and effect sizes of .2–.5 — “not sufficient to meet standards of predictive validity” [2]. Morris’ systematic review is blunter: “relatively little empirical research has been conducted on experiential learning,” and “the lack of empirical foundation to the model remains a foremost concern” — a criticism applying equally to the alternatives proposed to replace it, which “also lack sound empirical foundations” [8]. Coffield et al. make the parallel point about pedagogy: the implications for teaching “have been drawn logically from the theory rather than from research findings” [3].
The defensible reading is narrow. The cycle is useful as a checklist for sequencing instruction — four things a course can be audited against — and that use survives the critique, because it does not require the cycle to be an accurate model of what happens in a head. Diagnosing an individual’s style and matching instruction to it does not survive it.
VI. Adjacent traditions, and the “hands-on” confusion
Reflective practice (Schön). Schön rejected “technical rationality” as unable to resolve the tension between rigour and relevance in professional work, proposing an epistemology in which practice knowledge is “artful doing”, and distinguishing reflection-in-action — reconsidering a situation while it is still unfolding, typically prompted by surprise — from reflection-on-action, the retrospective review after the encounter [12], [13]. The distinction is contested: Eraut questions whether reflection-in-action is coherent when decisions must be near-instantaneous, and Richardson calls the concept “quite empty of content” with respect to the values underlying practice [13].
Structured reflection (Boud). Boud, Keogh and Walker’s edited collection is the standard reference for treating reflection as a teachable, structurable process rather than an incidental by-product of activity [14].
Service learning. Bringle and Hatcher define it as “a credit-bearing educational experience in which students participate in an organized service activity that meets identified community needs and reflect on the service activity in such a way as to gain further understanding of course content, a broader appreciation of the discipline, and an enhanced sense of civic responsibility” [11]. They bound it in both directions: “unlike extracurricular voluntary service, service learning is a course-based service experience,” and “unlike practica and internships, the experiential activity in a service learning course is not necessarily skill-based within the context of professional education” [11]. The distinguishing commitment is civic.
Experiential learning is not “hands-on” activity. Activity supplies concrete experience only — one pole of one of the two dialectics. On the theory’s own terms the other three modes are required for learning to occur [1, p. 30], and Morris’ review of 60 empirical studies concluded that “critical reflection acts as a mediator of meaningful learning” [8]. Dewey’s qualification, that not all experience is equally educative [15], is the same point stated a half-century earlier.
VII. Limitations
First, the theory’s central term is not operationally defined. What counts as a “concrete experience” remains unresolved: Morris found educators disagree over whether reading a book or attending a lecture qualifies — a striking ambiguity in the construct the theory is named after [8]. Without an agreed boundary, an “experiential” intervention is not a specifiable treatment, which is part of why the empirical literature resists aggregation.
Second, the most widely used product of the theory is its weakest. The Learning Style Inventory met one of four minimal psychometric criteria in independent review [3]; the current version has no published test–retest evidence at all [7]; and the instructional payoff the enterprise rests on — matching instruction to diagnosed style — has no supporting evidence of the required design and some contradicting it [5]. That the inventory is still used at scale [6] is a fact about the field, not about the evidence.
Third, the cycle’s usefulness and the cycle’s truth are separate claims, and only the first is supported. Endorsements rest on intuitive appeal and logical deduction from theory rather than on findings; Coffield et al. identify exactly this pattern, noting of one prominent advocate that the claims made for the cycle “have intuitive appeal but await empirical verification” [3]. A framework that helps instructors notice what a course omits is a real contribution. It is not evidence that learning proceeds in four stages around a circle.
References
(not read) marks a source not obtained in full; every claim attributed to it is quoted from a source that was read, as noted.
[1] D. A. Kolb, Experiential Learning: Experience as the Source of Learning and Development. Englewood Cliffs, NJ, USA: Prentice-Hall, 1984. (not read — cited for attribution; quotations taken verbatim from [2] and [8] with the page numbers those sources give.)
[2] D. A. Kolb, R. E. Boyatzis, and C. Mainemelis, “Experiential Learning Theory: Previous Research and New Directions,” in Perspectives on Cognitive, Learning, and Thinking Styles, R. J. Sternberg and L. F. Zhang, Eds. NJ, USA: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2000.
[3] F. Coffield, D. Moseley, E. Hall, and K. Ecclestone, Should We Be Using Learning Styles? What Research Has to Say to Practice. London, U.K.: Learning and Skills Research Centre, 2004.
[4] F. Coffield, D. Moseley, E. Hall, and K. Ecclestone, Learning Styles and Pedagogy in Post-16 Learning: A Systematic and Critical Review. London, U.K.: Learning and Skills Research Centre, 2004. (not read — the companion full review, referenced throughout [3]; all findings attributed to it here are quoted from [3].)
[5] H. Pashler, M. McDaniel, D. Rohrer, and R. Bjork, “Learning Styles: Concepts and Evidence,” Psychological Science in the Public Interest, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 105–119, 2008, doi: 10.1111/j.1539-6053.2009.01038.x.
[6] P. M. Newton, “The Learning Styles Myth Is Thriving in Higher Education,” Frontiers in Psychology, vol. 6, art. 1908, 2015, doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01908.
[7] A. Y. Kolb and D. A. Kolb, The Kolb Learning Style Inventory 4.0: A Comprehensive Guide to the Theory, Psychometrics, Research on Validity and Educational Applications. Experience Based Learning Systems, 2013.
[8] T. H. Morris, “Experiential learning — a systematic review and revision of Kolb’s model,” Interactive Learning Environments, vol. 28, no. 8, 2020, doi: 10.1080/10494820.2019.1570279. (Author’s accepted manuscript; its pagination differs from the version of record and is not cited.)
[9] H. Bergsteiner, G. C. Avery, and R. Neumann, “Kolb’s experiential learning model: critique from a modelling perspective,” Studies in Continuing Education, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 29–46, 2010, doi: 10.1080/01580370903534355. (not read — abstract only; quoted phrase from [8].)
[10] R. Miettinen, “The concept of experiential learning and John Dewey’s theory of reflective thought and action,” International Journal of Lifelong Education, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 54–72, 2000, doi: 10.1080/026013700293458. (not read — quoted via [8].)
[11] R. G. Bringle and J. A. Hatcher, “Implementing Service Learning in Higher Education,” Journal of Higher Education, vol. 67, no. 2, 1996.
[12] D. A. Schön, The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action. New York, NY, USA: Basic Books, 1983. (not read — cited for attribution; Section VI rests on [13].)
[13] M. K. Smith, “Donald Schön (Schon): learning, reflection and change,” infed.org — the encyclopedia of pedagogy and informal education, 2001, updated 2024. (An encyclopedia entry, not peer-reviewed; read in full.)
[14] D. Boud, R. Keogh, and D. Walker, Eds., Reflection: Turning Experience into Learning. London, U.K.: Kogan Page, 1985. (not read — cited for attribution only.)
[15] J. Dewey, Experience and Education. New York, NY, USA: Collier Books, 1963 (orig. 1938). (not read — quotation taken from [8], whose reference list supplies this edition.)
[16] D. A. Kolb, Experiential Learning: Experience as the Source of Learning and Development. Upper Saddle River, NJ, USA: Pearson, 2015. (not read — quoted via [8].)